1992 famine in Somalia

During the second half of 1992 the famine largely began to recede.[13]

Food prices across the country dropped dramatically from July to September 1992. The primary reason was that the lull in fighting in the south had allowed the first crop harvest in the Lower Shebelle region, which had proved to be surprisingly bountiful.[13]

By the time most international media had taken notice in the famine, the peak in mortality had largely already passed,[16] though pockets of starvation in Baidoa and Bardheere in September would lead to the apex of the famine with approximately 30,000 people dying that month.[17] Soon after, weekly death rates in the city of Baidoa had dropped from 1,700 in September to 300 by mid-November 1992.[13]

In the view of UNOSOM advisor John Drysdale, the UN Secretary-Generals claim that starvation was a direct result of continuing insecurity in Somalia during late 1992 was, "...dubious in the extreme".[2]

The second important factor in the suppression of starvation was large scale international food deliveries.[13] In May 1992 the first UN aid shipment arrived in Mogadishu.[18] The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) would distribute 75% of all food aid coming into Somalia,[5] and managed the majority of all US based aid. The organization operated 400 kitchens across the country.[19] It is believed that at its peak the ICRC provided some form of relief to over 2 million Somalis.[20] For its efforts the ICRC was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize.[5]

In April 1992 UNOSOM I was to established to respond to the famine.[21][22] According to an estimate made in November 1994 by the Washington-based Refugee Policy Group NGO, approximately 100,000 lives were saved as a result of international assistance during the famine.[16] US airlifts that had begun in August 1992 and gone on until December has credited with saving around 40,000 of those lives.[23] Head of UNOSOM in Somalia, Mohamed Sahnoun, would later criticize aid agencies for overwhelmingly focusing on Mogadishu when starvation in the country was elsewhere.[24]

According to the Refugee Policy Group NGO, approximately 10,000 of the 100,000 saved by foreign aid had been rescued following the deployment of U.S. and international troops during December 1992's Operation Restore Hope.[16] US government commissioned report aligns with these figures claiming an estimated 10,000-25,000 saved following the December 1992 intervention.[23]

By early 1993 food prices had fallen well below production costs and farmers in the riverine areas would report grain stores full from previous unsold harvests. Despite the significant improvement in mortality due to the resumption of agricultural production and international aid, death rates in southern Somalia were still above normal.[13]

Estimates of the amount of food aid looted greatly vary, ranging from 10 to 80%.[25]

The ICRC claimed that 10-15% of food aid deliveries were "unaccounted losses" which were often conflated with looting. Professor Alex de Waal claims this was an optimistic assessment and that the number was likely higher, but notes that much of what was counted in the figure was not hijackings or robberies. A significant portion of the food considered under the umbrella of an "unaccounted loss" was actually given up through agreements between the ICRC and its 24,000 employees/subcontractors in Somalia, who were usually paid in food. When food was stolen it was often through non-violent means such as the registration of "ghost kitchens" or "ghost villages" that did not actually exist.[26]

At its peak, the maximum figure of looting was somewhere under 50% of aid and according to the Red Cross, the majority eventually reached its intended destination.[27] In October 1992 United Nations Special Representative to Somalia Mohamed Sahnoun estimated that the majority of deliveries had around 15% looted, but that the number increased to as much as 40% of higher quality items.[28] In an interview with American war correspondent Scott Peterson Sahnoun would comment on looting by militias stating, "We see that there is a limit to the authority of Aidid and others, though they do not want to confess their inability to control, their powerlessness,"[29]

Some UN World Food Programme officials went as far to claim that 80% of all food aid shipments were being looted, a figure that has been heavily disputed.[30][23] This number was later used by President George H.W. Bush to justify the deployment of US troops to Somalia in December 1992.[25] The estimate was directly disputed by Pakistani Brigadier-General Imtiaz Shaheen (head of the first UN troop contingent to Somalia) in an interview with British journalist Mark Huband as Operation Restore Hope began in Mogadishu. General Shaheen claimed that the amount of aid being looted was being exaggerated in order justify expanding the scope of the operation and that estimates of 80% were completely fabricated.[30]