Parrhesia
In rhetoric, parrhesia (Greek: παρρησία) is candid speech, speaking freely.[1] It implies not only freedom of speech, but the obligation to speak the truth for the common good, even at personal risk.
Etymology
The earliest recorded use of the term parrhesia is by Euripides in the fifth century B.C.[2][3] Parrhesia means literally "to speak everything" and by extension "to speak freely", "to speak boldly", or "boldness".[4]
Usage in ancient Greece
In the Classical period, parrhesia was a fundamental component of the Athenian democracy. In the courts or the Ecclesia, the assembly of citizens, Athenians were free to say almost anything. In the Dionysia, playwrights such as Aristophanes made full use of their right to ridicule whomever they chose.[5] Outside of the theatre or government however, there were limits to what might be said; freedom to discuss politics, morals, religion, or to criticize people would depend upon the context: by whom it was made, and when, and how, and where.[6] If one was seen as immoral, or held views that went contrary to popular opinion, then there were great risks involved in making use of such an unrestricted freedom of speech, such as being charged with impiety (Asebeia). This was the pretext under which Socrates was executed in 399 BCE, for dishonoring the gods and corrupting the young.[5] In actuality, Socrates was more likely punished for his close association with many of the participants in the Athenian coup of 411 BC, because it was widely believed at the time that Socrates' philosophical teachings had served as an intellectual justification for their seizure of power.[7]
In later Hellenistic philosophy, parrhesia was a central concept for the Cynic philosophers, as epitomized in the shamelessness of Diogenes of Sinope.[8] According to Philodemus, parrhesia was also used by the Epicureans in the form of frank criticism of each other that was intended to help the target of criticism achieve the cessation of pain and reach a state of ataraxia.[9]
In the Greek New Testament, parrhesia is the ability of Jesus or his followers to hold their own in discourse before political and religious authorities such as the Pharisees.[10][1][11][12]
Usage in rabbinic Jewish writings
Parrhesia appears in Midrashic literature as a condition for the transmission of Torah. Connoting open and public communication, parrhesia appears in combination with the term δῆμος (dimus, short for dimosia), translated coram publica, in the public eye, i.e. open to the public.[13] As a mode of communication it is repeatedly described in terms analogous to a commons. Parrhesia is closely associated with an ownerless wilderness of primary mytho-geographic import, the Midbar Sinai in which the Torah was initially received. The dissemination of Torah thus depends on its teachers cultivating a nature that is as open, ownerless, and sharing as that wilderness.[14] The term is important to advocates of Open Source Judaism.[15] Here is the text from the Mekhilta where the term dimus parrhesia appears (see bolded text).
- "ויחנו במדבר" (שמות פרק יט פסוק ב) נתנה תורה דימוס פרהסייא במקום הפקר, שאלו נתנה בארץ ישראל, היו אומרים לאומות העולם אין להם חלק בה, לפיכך נתנה במדבר דימוס פרהסייא במקום הפקר, וכל הרוצה לקבל יבא ויקבל...[16]
- Torah was given over dimus parrhesia in a maqom hefker (a place belonging to no one). For had it been given in the Land of Israel, they would have had cause to say to the nations of the world, “you have no share in it.” Thus was it given dimus parrhesia, in a place belonging to no one: “Let all who wish to receive it, come and receive it!”
Explanation: Why was the Torah not given in the land of Israel? In order that the peoples of the world should not have the excuse for saying: `Because it was given in Israel's land, therefore we have not accepted it.[17]
- ...דבר אחר: שלא להטיל מחלוקת בין השבטים שלא יהא זה אומר בארצי נתנה תורה וזה אומר בארצי נתנה תורה לפיכך נתנה תורה במדבר דימוס בפרהסיא במקום הפקר, בשלשה דברים נמשלה תורה במדבר באש ובמים לומר לך מה אלו חנם אף דברי תורה חנם לכל באי עולם. [18]
- Another reason: To avoid causing dissension among the tribes [of Israel]. Else one might have said: In my land the Torah was given. And the other might have said: In my land the Torah was given. Therefore, the Torah was given in the Midbar (wilderness, desert), dimus parrhesia, in a place belonging to no one. To three things the Torah is likened: to the Midbar, to fire, and to water. This is to tell one that just as these three things are free to all who come into the world, so also are the words of the Torah free to all who come into the world.
The term "parrhesia" is also used in Modern Hebrew (usually spelled פרהסיה), meaning [in] public.
Modern scholarship
Michel Foucault developed the concept of parrhesia as a mode of discourse in which one speaks openly and truthfully about one's opinions and ideas without the use of rhetoric, manipulation, or generalization.[19] Foucault's use of parrhesia, he tells us, is troubled by our modern day Cartesian model of evidential necessity. For Descartes, truth is the same as the undeniable . Whatever cannot be doubted must be, and, thus, speech that is not examined or criticized does not necessarily have a valid relation to truth.
There are several conditions upon which the traditional ancient Greek notion of parrhesia relies. One who uses parrhesia is only recognized as doing so if holding a credible relationship to the truth, if one serves as critic to either oneself or popular opinion or culture, if the revelation of this truth places one in a position of danger and one persists in speaking the truth, nevertheless, as one feels it is a moral, social, and/or political obligation. Further, in a public situation, a user of parrhesia must be in a social position less empowered than those to whom this truth is revealed.
Foucault (1983) sums up the ancient Greek concept of parrhesia as follows:
[T]he parrhesiastes is someone who takes a risk. Of course, this risk is not always a risk of life. When, for example, you see a friend doing something wrong and you risk incurring his anger by telling him he is wrong, you are acting as a parrhesiastes. In such a case, you do not risk your life, but you may hurt him by your remarks, and your friendship may consequently suffer for it. If, in a political debate, an orator risks losing his popularity because his opinions are contrary to the majority's opinion, or his opinions may usher in a political scandal, he uses parrhesia. Parrhesia, then, is linked to courage in the face of danger: it demands the courage to speak the truth in spite of some danger. And in its extreme form, telling the truth takes place in the "game" of life or death.[20]
and
[P]arrhesia is a kind of verbal activity where the speaker has a specific relation to truth through frankness, a certain relationship to his own life through danger, a certain type of relation to himself or other people through criticism (self-criticism or criticism of other people), and a specific relation to moral law through freedom and duty. More precisely, parrhesia is a verbal activity in which a speaker expresses his personal relationship to truth, and risks his life because he recognizes truth-telling as a duty to improve or help other people (as well as himself). In parrhesia, the speaker uses his freedom and chooses frankness instead of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, the risk of death instead of life and security, criticism instead of flattery, and moral duty instead of self-interest and moral apathy.[21]
Foucault (1984) writes:
The Parrhesiastes is the person who says everything. Thus, as an example, in his discourse "On the Embassy," Demosthenes says: It is necessary to speak with parrhesia, without holding back at anything without concealing anything. Similarly, in the "First Philippic," he takes up exactly the same term and says: I will tell you what I think without concealing anything.[22]
See also
References
- Burton, Gideon O. "Parrhesia". Sylva Rhetoricae. Brigham Young University. Archived from the original on 2007-05-26. Retrieved 2007-05-24.
speak[ing] candidly or ... ask[ing] forgiveness for so speaking
- παρρησία. Liddell, Henry George; Scott, Robert; A Greek–English Lexicon at the Perseus Project
- Greek παρρησία parrhēsía (πᾶν "all" and ῥῆσις "utterance, speech")
- παρρησία. Liddell, Henry George; Scott, Robert; A Greek–English Lexicon at the Perseus Project
- Wallace, Robert W (2002), "The Power to Speak — and not to listen – in Ancient Athens", in Sluiter, Ineke; Rosen, Ralph Mark (eds.), Free Speech in Classical Antiquity, Brill, pp. 222–3.
- Roberts, John Willoby (1984), City of Sokrates, Routledge, p. 148
- Stone, I. F. (1979-04-08). "I.F. STONE BREAKS THE SOCRATES STORY". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2022-10-18.
- Navia, Luis E, Diogenes the Cynic, Humanity Books, p. 179.
- Konstan D, Clay D and Glad CE: Philodemus: On frank criticism (Peri parrhesias). Society of Biblical Literature, Atlanta, USA, 2007.
- e.g. Acts 4:13: "Now when they saw the boldness [την παρρησίαν] of Peter and John and realized that they were uneducated and ordinary men, they were amazed and recognized them as companions of Jesus."
- Long, William 'Bill' (December 1, 2004), "Parrhesia and Earliest Christianity", Even more words.
- Schlier, Heinrich (1967), "παρρησία, παρρησιάζομαι", in Kittel, Gerhard; Friedrich, Gerhard (eds.), Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, vol. V, Ann Arbor: Eerdmans, pp. 871ff.
- A meaning found in Sylloge lnscriptionum Graecum, 2nd edition, ed. Diltenberger 1888-1901, no.807, an inscription from after 138 C. E.
- Bamidbar Rabbah 1:7
- Varady, Aharon. "'Make yourself into a Maqom Hefker': Teachings on Open Source in Judaism" (sourcesheet). The Open Siddur Project. Retrieved 29 June 2014.
- "Mekhilta de Rebbi Yishmael".
- "5", Mekhilta de Rabbi Ishmael, vol. Tractate Baḥodesh, JHU, on Shemot 20:2, ISBN 978-0-82761003-3.
- "Yalkut Shimoni".
- Foucault, Michel (Oct–Nov 1983), Discourse and Truth: the Problematization of Parrhesia (six lectures), The University of California at Berkeley.
- Michel Foucault. Fearless Speech. pp. 15–16.
- Michel Foucault. Fearless Speech. pp. 19–20.
- Michel Foucault. The Courage of Truth. p. 9.
External links


- "Discourse and Truth: the Problematization of Parrhesia. (Six lectures given by Michel Foucault at the University of California at Berkeley, Oct-Nov. 1983)" (PDF)
- "Aphasia+Parrhesia: Code and Speech in the Neural Topographies of the Net". Christina McPhee (2003).
- Raunig, Gerald (1 April 2004). Translated by Derieg, Aileen. "The Double Criticism of parrhesia. Answering the Question 'What is a Progressive (Art) Institution?'". Transversal. European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies. ISSN 1811-1696.
- Verde Garrido, Miguelángel (2 July 2015). "Contesting a biopolitics of information and communications: The importance of truth and sousveillance after Snowden". Surveillance & Society. 13 (2): 153–167. doi:10.24908/ss.v13i2.5331. ISSN 1477-7487.