Influence-for-hire

Influence-for-hire or collective influence, refers to the economy that has emerged around buying and selling influence on social media platforms.[1]

Overview

Companies that engage in the influence-for-hire industry range from content farms to high end public relations agencies. Traditionally influence operations have largely been confined to public sector actors like intelligence agencies, in the influence-for-hire industry the groups conduction the operations are private with commerce being their primary consideration. However many of the clients in the influence-for-hire industry are countries or countries acting through proxies.[1] They are often located in countries with less expensive digital labor.[2]

History

In May 2021, Facebook took a Ukrainian influence-for-hire network offline. Facebook attributed the network to organizations and consultants linked to Ukrainian politicians including Andriy Derkach.[3][4]

During the COVID-19 pandemic state sponsored misinformation was spread through influence-for-hire networks.[5]

In August 2021, a report published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute implicated the Chinese government and the ruling Chinese Communist Party in campaigns of online manipulation conducted against Australia and Taiwan using influence-for-hire.[6][7][8][9]

See also

References
  1. Wallace, Jacob; Boggle, Ariel; Zhang, Albert; Mansour, Hillary. "Influence for hire. The Asia-Pacific's online shadow economy". www.aspi.org.au. ASPI. Retrieved 14 August 2021.
  2. KIPAROIDZE, MARIAM. "'Influence for hire' networks are manipulating online discussions throughout the Asia Pacific region". www.codastory.com. Coda Story. Retrieved 14 August 2021.
  3. Culliford, Elizabeth. "Facebook Removes Ukraine Political 'Influence-For-Hire' Network". www.usnews.com. US News. Retrieved 14 August 2021.
  4. Somerville, Hannah. "Ukrainian MP blasts 'hysterical' Facebook after influence network busted". www.euronews.com. Euro News. Retrieved 14 August 2021.
  5. Mansour, Hillary; Nkwanyana, Khwezi; Page, Matthew. "The threat spectrum". www.aspistrategist.org.au. ASPI. Retrieved 14 August 2021.
  6. Gibson, Liam. "CCP outsourcing propaganda campaigns to content farms in Taiwan and Australia: Think tank". www.taiwannews.com.tw. Taiwan News. Retrieved 14 August 2021.
  7. Galloway, Anthony. "Growing online 'influence-for-hire' economy opens door for foreign interference: report". www.smh.com.au. Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 14 August 2021.
  8. Barbaschow, Asha. "ASPI suggests government work with platforms to fight disinformation for hire". www.zdnet.com. ZDNet. Retrieved 14 August 2021.
  9. Rae, Marion. "China hides behind hackers for hire: study". thewest.com.au. The West Australian. Retrieved 14 August 2021.
This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.