United Nations Operation in Somalia II

On 3 March 1993, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council his recommendations for effecting the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. He noted that despite the size of the UNITAF mission, a secure environment was not yet established. There was still no effective functioning government or local security/police force.[21] The Secretary-General concluded that, should the Security Council determine that the time had come for the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, the latter should be endowed with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to establish a secure environment throughout Somalia.[21] UNOSOM II would therefore seek to complete the task begun by UNITAF. The new mandate would also empower UNOSOM II to assist in rebuilding their economic, political and social life, so as to recreate a Somali State. Most notably it would also mandate the disarmament of Somali militias.[22]

The new UN-controlled mission, to be called UNOSOM II, was established by the Security Council in Resolution 814 (1993) on 26 March 1993. It did not formally take over operations in Somalia until UNITAF was dissolved on 4 May 1993. While Somalia was not placed under the rule of a UN trusteeship like it had been in the 1950s, UNOSOM II was given authority to make decisions for and on behalf of the Somali people. Many future accusations of UN 're-colonization' would arise from the change in mandate. By invoking Chapter VII, the United Nations fundamentally changed the nature of its operation in Somalia, which would become a primary source of future contention.[12]

Major disagreements between the UN and the Somali National Alliance began soon after the establishment of UNOSOM II, centering on the perceived true nature of the operations political mandate. In May 1993, relations between the SNA and UNOSOM would rapidly deteriorate following two significant events.[22]

While the Addis Ababa conference was in progress in March the Somali National Front (SNF), pro-Barre faction that was vehemently opposed to Aidid, began to infiltrate weapons into the Somali port city of Kismayo, which was under the control of UNITAF forces at the time. Gen. Hersi Morgan, commander of the SNF, drove out the Somali National Alliance forces under the command of Col. Omar Jess.[22]

On 7 May, three days after UNOSOM II took control of Kismayo from UNITAF, the SNA made an attempt to retake the city. During the assault the Belgian peacekeepers stationed in the town intervened, considering the assault to take Kismayo an attack on their positions and consequently repelled the SNA forces. The fall of Kismayo to Gen. Morgan infuriated the Somali National Alliance. To the SNA the incident was viewed as blatant U.N. partiality, as UNITAF had failed to prevent Morgan from seizing the city and UNOSOM had then fought SNA forces who had tried to retake it.[22]

In May, Gen. Aidid and Col. Abdullahi Yusuf of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front would agree to hold a peace conference for the central region of Somalia. Gen. Aidid had initiated the consultations with Col. Yusuf and consequently viewed himself as the convener and chair of the conference who would be responsible for establishing the agenda. He would invite Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, Adm. Johnathan Howe to open the conference.[22]

Aidid sought to focus the conference only on Somalia's central regions, and soon ran into conflict with UNOSOM. The UN sought to broaden participation of the conference to other regions of Somalia and suspicious of Aidid, sought to replace his chairmanship over the conference with former Somali President Abdullah Osman, who hated Aidid and had publicly called for his arrest.[22]

The differences between Aidid and the UN proved to be to great, and the conference proceeded without the United Nations participation. The contention between the Somali National alliance and UNOSOM from that point forward would begin to manifest in anti-UNOSOM propaganda broadcast from SNA controlled Radio Mogadishu.[22]

Radio Mogadishu was a highly popular broadcast station with the residents of the city, and was a vital piece of SNA infrastructure that had been captured following a vicious battle with Ali Mahdi's forces. Following the Kismayo and Galkayo incidents that station began to air anti-UNOSOM propaganda, incensing high ranking UN personnel. It was feared that the broadcasts would shift the attitudes of the Somali public towards the United Nations operation, leading UNOSOM officials to resolve to close the station. In mid-May, the Pakistani contingent was asked to draw up a plan to shut down the station. The Pakistanis did not possess the technical expertise required for such an operation and requested that the US supply experts.[22][27]

Importantly, Radio Mogadishu had also been an Authorized Weapons Store Site (AWSS), subject to UNOSOM inspection. It was decided the American special forces technicians would accompany a Pakistani weapons inspection team to the site in order to determine how to disable the station. Gen. Aidid and the upper echelons of the Somali National Alliance, had been made aware of the discussions to seize or destroy the station.[22]

According to the 1994 United Nations Inquiry:

Opinions differ, even among UNOSOM officials, on whether the weapons inspections of 5 June 1993 was genuine or was merely a cover-up for reconnaissance and subsequent seizure of Radio Mogadishu.[28]

On June 5, a Pakistani force was sent to investigate an arms depot belonging to a Somali warlord vying for the Presidency, Mohamed Farrah Aidid. When the Pakistani force arrived, they encountered angry Somali protesters. Twenty-four Pakistani soldiers inspecting weapons as part of the expanded UN mandate were killed when forces believed to be associated with Aidid launched a fatal attack on the troops.[29]

The UN responded the next day with Resolution 837, reaffirming that the secretary-general was authorized to "take all necessary measures against those responsible for the armed attacks and to establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia."[30] This was essentially equivalent to declaring war on Aidid, a declaration that would lead to numerous confrontations between UNOSOM II and the SNA.[31] Though UNOSOM II had fewer war-fighting resources than UNITAF, it was much more ambitious and aggressive. On 12 June 1993 U.S. troops began a military offensive around Mogadishu. On 17 June, a $25,000 warrant was issued by Admiral Jonathan Howe for information leading to the arrest of Aidid, but he was never captured.[25] Professor Ioan M. Lewis would argue that instead of initiating an independent legal inquiry and seeking to politically isolate Aidid, UNOSOM II decided to unwisely employ military force which resulted in significant Somali casualties.[32]

The hunt for Aidid characterized much of the UNOSOM II intervention. The increasing tempo of military operations carried out in Mogadishu caused civilian casualties and began to seriously affect the relationship between UN troops and the Somali people. UNOSOM forces were portrayed as foreign interlopers and imperialists, particularly after incidents of civilian casualties caused by wholesale firing into crowds by peace keepers.[33][34][35] Each major armed confrontation with UNOSOM was noted to have the deleterious effect of increasing Aidid's stature with the Somali public.[36] Many Mogadishu residents were reportedly deeply disturbed by the effects of heavy weaponry utilized by foreign troops in Mogadishu, such as AC-130s, helicopter gunships, wire-guided TOW missiles and rockets.[37] In the view of Professor Mats Berdal of the Department of War Studies at King's College, the conduct of US armed forces during the conflict demonstrated that the American military was not attuned to the requirements of low-level military operations that Somalia required at the time. He would argue that, "[There is] a distinctive mindset and approach to low-intensity operations which had been shaped by the American experience during and after Vietnam, and by a deeply entrenched belief in the efficacy of technology and firepower as a means of minimizing one’s own casualties. It is an approach that was inappropriate to the particular circumstances of Somalia."[38] BBC East Africa correspondent Mark Doyle would describe the war between the SNA and UNOSOM forces as seen by journalists in Mogadishu:

Typical daylight hours in south Mogadishu thunder to the sound of American helicopter gunships criss-crossing the skies at low level; militia with small arms or rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPGs) take aim at what they see as an offensive provocation. It's not unusual, from the main hotel in south Mogadishu, to view open battles, with U.S. helicopters firing 20-millimeter cannons at apparent militia ground positions. From other vantage points, full-scale battles have been observed pitting Turkish tanks, Pakistani APCs, and American Humvees against the militia. All this has taken place in a heavily built-up urban environment, with the inevitable heavy casualties. By night, the macabre events continue. Loud explosions are common as militia mortars are aimed at the UN compound or the fortified, UN-controlled airport. UN forces' flares light up the sky in an often futile attempt to pinpoint their enemy. Slow dull tracer fire streaks across the blackness from the militias' weapons. The crack-crack-crack and flash-flash-flash of cannons fired from U.S. helicopter gunships can be seen spitting at apparent militia emplacements.[39]

Former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Ramesh Thakur stated that, "The scale, intensity, and frequency of the use of force by UNOSOM after June 1993 bore little resemblance to the rhetoric and expectations of when it was established, nor any recognizable relationship by then to a peacekeeping operation as defined in the UN lexicon."[11] The UNOSOM offensive had significant negative political consequences for the intervention as it alienated the Somali people, strengthened political support for Aidid, and led to growing criticism of the operation internationally. As a result numerous UNOSOM II contingents began to increasingly push for a more conciliatory and diplomatic approach with the SNA.[40]

On 12 July 1993, a house where a meeting of clan elders was taking place was attacked by US AH-1 Cobra helicopters in what became known to the Somalis as Bloody Monday.[31] UNOSOM claimed that they had launched a successful raid on a Somali National Alliance command and control center where hardliners had been gathered, an account that is widely disputed by Somalis, foreign journalists and human rights organizations.[41][13][42][43][44] According to Dr. Sebastian Kaempf, the Abdi House raid represented the single most important event during UNOSOM II, as the consequences of the attack proved disastrous for UNOSOM interests in Somalia.[45] Black Hawk Down author Mark Bowden noted 12 July had been a serious mistake and had the effect of firmly uniting a large portion of Mogadishu behind Aidid.[46] Notable groups and organizations such as the Vatican, the Organisation of African Unity, World Vision, Doctors Without Borders, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International called for UNOSOM to review it policies and course.[47][11][48][49][50]

The attack exposed deep rifts and created dissension amongst coalition nations contributing troops to UNOSOM II, which began fraying the cohesion and unity of the operation.[51][52][53] The head of the UNOSOM II Justice Division would criticize the raid in a memo to head of UNOSOM, US Admiral Johnathan Howe.[54] Further criticism of the raid came from numerous contributing states such as Ireland, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Zimbabwe, but most notably the Italian contingent, who threatened to pull out of the whole operation a few days later citing concerns that the escalation was indicative that relief role of UNOSOM II had been overtaken by an American-led campaign against Mohammed Farah Aidid.[55][56][57][58] The Italians, who had ruled Somalia as a colonial territory for half a century, believed that the unprecedented attack threatened to widen the civil war and turn the Somalis against the entire UN peacekeeping force.[59][60][61] A Pakistani officer in Mogadishu noted that the clash between the Americans and Italians was destroying the cohesion of UNOSOM II, and that a review of strategy was desperately needed.[51] American envoy to Somalia, Robert B. Oakley, stated that after the raid countries such as Italy, France, and Zimbabwe, as well as other UNOSOM contingents, ceased their participation in operations against Aidid upon receiving orders from their respective governments. This decision weakened the United Nations' already fragile command authority. Additionally, many humanitarian efforts came to a halt, and numerous non-governmental organizations expressed their disapproval of both the United Nations and the United States.[62] Intense diplomatic efforts were consequently made in order to avert a major split in UNOSOM II.[53]

The strike also caused an outcry among UN civilian staffers and disenchantment over the direction of UNOSOM II for employees of the humanitarian section.[63][64][65] At least nine UN civilian employees in Mogadishu working for the humanitarian sector either resigned or walked away from their posts in protest, including the top UNOSOM Justice Division official in Somalia, Ann Wright.[65][63] Many of those who stayed would comment to reporters that the United Nations had relinquished its moral authority in its war against Aidid.[65]

The dissension in the U.N. ranks with the Italians and others over what had occurred on July 12, 1993, led to a significant lull in UNOSOM operations in Mogadishu until the August 8, 1993 killings of American soldiers.[63] The raid would lead to a significant increase in attacks on UNOSOM II troops and American forces in Mogadishu being deliberately targeted by Somali factions for the first times.[45][40]

US Black Hawk patrols over Mogadishu following the deployment of Task Force Ranger

Somali militias and volunteers increasingly began targeting UNOSOM II and US forces, causing further casualties. Following the 12 July 1993 raid, firefights between the SNA and UNOSOM began occurring almost daily.[66]

As American casualties started to mount in Somalia, domestic backlash in the United States grew. Bipartisan support from the US senate began to build for a withdrawal. By August 1993, it was evident to the Clinton administration that a strategy shift was necessary to retain domestic support for US involvement in Somalia. This shift was signalled earlier by Defense Secretary Les Aspin in his 27 August speech, advocating for a decreased military focus in UNOSOM II and urging the UN and the OAU to resume negotiations with all parties. Both the US Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor pushed for a shift towards diplomacy.[40] Certain US officials advocated for a more aggressive response, among them was Ambassador Robert R. Gosende from the State Department. Gosende had written a cable recommending the deployment of thousands of additional troops and urged the abandonment of all diplomatic engagements with the SNA. Contrarily, General Joseph P. Hoar, who was at the helm of CENTCOM, expressed sharp disagreement with Gosende's approach. In a confidential memo, General Hoar articulated his belief that if more American troops were needed, then control of Mogadishu was already lost.[67][40]

On 8 August, SNA forces detonated a remote controlled bomb against a U.S. military vehicle, first killing four American soldiers and then, two weeks later, injured seven more.[68] In response, President Bill Clinton approved the proposal to deploy a special task force composed of 400 US Army Rangers and Delta-force Commandos.[41] Despite growing reservations about the effectiveness of UNOSOM military operations against the Somali National Alliance, the immediate concern of protecting US forces led to the decision to deploy elite forces. An elite unit, named Task Force Ranger, consisted of 160 elite US troops was flown into Mogadishu and began a manhunt for Aidid in what became known as Operation Gothic Serpent. On October 3, 1993, Task Force Ranger raided a hotel in Mogadishu to capture high ranking SNA personnel. What ensued was the longest, bloodiest and deadliest battle for US and UNOSOM II troops in Somalia. In what later became known as the Battle of Mogadishu, eighteen US soldiers were killed. Images of their dead bodies being dragged through the streets were broadcast on internationally, infuriating the American public.[40]

US soldiers completely withdrew on March 3, 1994, 28 days earlier than expected.[15] Other nations, including Italy, Belgium, France and Sweden, also decided to withdraw at this time. On November 4, 1994, after peacemaking efforts by the remaining 1,900 UNOSOM II troops failed, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) voted unanimously to withdraw all forces in Resolution 954. Subsequently, on November 16, the UNSC authorized Resolution 955, placing new emphasis on peacemaking and reconstruction and returning to a less reactive role. The withdrawal of the remaining UN military and police troops from Somalia was completed on March 28, 1995, thereby ending UNOSOM II's mandate.

The month following the Battle of Mogadishu, the United States urged the United Nations to establish the commission to determine who was responsible for the clashes between UNOSOM II peacekeepers and Aidid's SNA forces. A three-man UN inquiry commission headed by Matthew Nglube, former chief justice of Zambia, Gen. Emmanuel Erskine of Ghana and Gen. Gustav Hagglund of Finland was set up by the Security Council. On 30 November 1993 the commission landed in Mogadishu.[77][22]

The report charged the Gen. Aidid with launching the 5 June 1993, attack which initiated the conflict between the SNA and UNOSOM. Notably, it also heavily criticized U.N. peacekeeping officials for embarking on a campaign of forceful disarmament of Somali factions, an effort that antagonized the Aidid's forces and sharpened tensions. The commission questioned the merit of the aggressive UNOSOM peacekeeping strategy and argued that the U.N. should not have abandoned its neutral role in Somalia.[77]

The inquiry criticized the United States for operating under a separate military command and leading raids against Aidid that were not coordinated with UNOSOM officers. The commission condemned the use of American combat helicopters over the heavily populated neighborhoods of Mogadishu and criticized tactics as "incompatible with basic tenets of peacekeeping". Financial reparations for Somali civilians who became victims of the fighting were recommend by the report.[77][22]

UNOSOM II was widely criticized for placing too much emphasis on military operations. Over 90% of the operations $1.6 billion budget was used for military or security purposes.[78][40] In July 1993, UN relief head Jan Eliasson publicly admonished UNOSOM II for spending 10 times as much on military operations in Somalia than it did on aid. At the time he would caution that the original objective of sending troops to Somalia was being forgotten.[79]

Ramesh Thakur, a former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, pointed out that the extent, intensity, and frequency of military force used by UNOSOM II after 5 June 1993, did not align with the principles and definition of a peacekeeping operation as defined by the United Nations.[11]

UNOSOM II forces were criticized for various instances of human rights abuses, violations of international law and excessive force by a wide range of academics, foreign correspondents and humanitarian organizations.[80][81][82][16][43] Doctors Without Borders,[83] Human Rights Watch[84] and Amnesty International[85] would all criticize UNOSOM II on these grounds. Africa Rights Watch and Doctors Without Borders would both publish detailed reports of abuses by UN forces during the summer of 1993.[16][86] While conceding UN troops were in a difficult position, the Africa Rights Watch report would conclude that abuses and atrocities carried out by UNOSOM II force stemmed from the highest echelons of the command structure and were not cases of undisciplined actions by individual soldiers.[16]

Some of the most widely criticized events that occurred from 5 June to 3–4 October 1993 include:

• US forces fired missiles at Digfer Hospital in Mogadishu on the belief that Aidids forces were hiding in the buildings, resulting in the deaths of nine patients.[87][16] Africa Rights Watch would assert that the incident represented a prima-facie case that UN command in Mogadishu had violated the Geneva Convention.[16]
• Pakistani forces fired on two large public demonstrations killing over 20 Somalis, many of whom were women and children.[88]
• US Quick Reaction Force launched the Abdi House raid during a meeting of Somali elders, resulting in the deaths of at least 60 civilians according to Amnesty International.[89][86][50]
• Rony Brauman, who was then serving as the president of Doctors Without Borders, detailed an incident in which the premises of Action Against Hunger in Mogadishu, also housing the Doctors Without Borders team, came under attack by UNOSOM forces. Two U.S. AH-1 Cobra helicopters, disregarding the clearly visible Red Cross flags and emblems of both humanitarian organizations on the building, fired two missiles at the compound before strafing it with machine-gun fire, resulting in the death of one aid worker and injuries to several others. According to Brauman the incident was triggered by the presence of a vehicle nearby which the attack helicopters had deemed suspicious, but belonged to journalists from the France 2 television channel.[90]
• In mid-September US AH-1 Cobra helicopters killed nearly 100 Somalis who were in the vicinity of a clash between the SNA and the 10th Mountain Division using TOW missiles and cannon fire.[91] Children living in the surrounding neighborhood had also been killed by stray helicopter fire.[92]

The UN's response to these events were characterized by a marked lack of transparency and accountability. Despite possessing internal advice from its own legal and political staff in Somalia, UNOSOM would reportedly disregard their input and criticism. Amnesty International would describe the UN's internal investigatory mechanisms for dealing with human rights violations by its troops in Somalia as highly inadequate and inconsistent with the UN's own standards.[89] In the vast majority of incidents no UN forces were ever reprimanded or punished.[93]

Former Under-Secretary-General Ramesh Thakur would further point out that UNOSOM II consistently undermined its authority by deceiving and misleading journalists. He noted that The Times correspondents in Mogadishu could recall numerous occasions where UNOSOM officials had lied to reporters.[11] BBC journalist Mark Doyle would note that reporters in Mogadishu often treated the versions of events purported by UNOSOM with as much skepticism as the version of events purported by Aidid. Doyle would claim that information given out by UN officials was sometimes deliberately misleading; and often UNOSOM would only give details of military operations if the reporters already possessed their own leads.[39] Reuters Mogadishu correspondent Aidan Hartley would later claim that UN officials, "...toed a line of propaganda that was palpably absurd to reporters who went around and saw what was happening."[94]

In one incident noted by both Aidan Hartley and Ramesh Thakur, an American AH-1 Cobra helicopter launched a missile strike into Mogadishu in front of a large crowd of Somalis and foreign correspondents. Witnesses watched and filmed the TOW missile leave the helicopter and spiral into a tea shop, killing a Somali woman. A press conference was held after, during which the UNOSOM spokesman flatly denied the eyewitness accounts and claimed that no helicopters had launched any attack. Following the denial, a TV cameraman got up and played the tape he had filmed of the helicopter firing the missile. UNOSOM would only admit responsibility after footage of the attack was later broadcast globally.[11][94] In another significant incident, Pakistani UNOSOM troops opened fire with a machine gun onto a crowd of protesters. Thousands of Somalis citizens and dozens foreign journalists had witnessed the troops open fire, unprovoked, from a rooftop emplacement resulting in the deaths of dozens of civilians, including women and children.[95] UNOSOM would claim that Somali National Alliance militia had used the crowd as human shields to fire on the Pakistanis, who then shot back in self defence.[96] According to The Washington Post, the UNOSOM account of the shooting was disputed by virtually all witnesses.[97]

According to American war correspondent Scott Peterson, US forces had censored images of mortars firing from UN bases directly into the city of Mogadishu by confiscating the pictures and arresting the photojournalist who had taken the image. In another incident, Associated Press photographer Peter Northall was photographing an American UH-60 Black Hawk purposely "rotor washing" a market in the city, only to then be directly targeted and assaulted with six percussion grenades from the helicopter. UNOSOM II press spokesman, US Maj. David Stockwell, would defend the incident stating that Northall posed "a threat to himself".[98]