Nationalism in South Korea

Nationalism in South Korea can refer to various forms of nationalism that appear in South Korea, but mainly to statism,[1] statist nationalism (국가주의)[2] to distinguish it from [Korean identity-based] "nationalism".[2] or ROK nationalism (대한민국 민족주의).[3]

Early South Korean-based nationalists such as Syngman Rhee, Lee Bum-seok, and Park Chung-hee were anti-communist state nationalists and ethnic nationalists at the same time, but South Korean-based nationalists in the 21st century, ethnic nationalist elements weakened and anti-communist state nationalist elements became stronger. The People Power Party, which is currently in power in South Korea, is a right-wing South Korean-based nationalist political party.

ROK nationalism

According to a study by BR Myers as of 2010, state-based nationalism or patriotism in South Korea is weak, compared with the more salient race-based nationalism.[4][5] As a result, some commentators have described the South Korean state in the eyes of South Koreans as constituting "an unloved republic".[6][7] Whereas in North Korea, most of its citizens view their state and race as being the same thing,[4][5] most South Koreans on the other hand tend to see the minjok (민족; "Korean nation" or "Korean race") and their [South Korean] state as being separate entities due to the existence of a competing Korean state in North Korea. According to Korea scholar Brian Reynolds Myers, a professor at Dongseo University, while race-based nationalism in North Korea strengthens patriotism towards the state and vice versa,[6] in South Korea it undermines it:

Anglophones tend to use the words nation and state more or less interchangeably, but when one nation is divided into two states, it's important to stick to the [South] Koreans' own practice of distinguishing clearly between nationalism (minjokjuŭi) and patriotism / state spirit (aeguksim, kukka chŏngsin, kukkajuŭi, etc). Historians do this even in English when discussing the Weimar Republic, where nationalism undermined support for the state – and for liberal democracy – just as it does in South Korea today.

Brian Reynolds Myers, "On Experts and Exegetes" (September 6, 2017), Sthele Press[8]

Due to traditional state support for race nationalism fostered during the 20th century, South Koreans have come to view positive achievements as being a result of inherent racial characteristics, whereas negative events are attributed to the incompetence and malevolence of the South Korean state:[5][6][9]

South Korean nationalism is something quite different from the patriotism toward the state that Americans feel. Identification with the Korean race is strong, while that with the Republic of Korea is weak.

Brian Reynolds Myers, "South Korea's Collective Shrug" (May 27, 2010), The New York Times.[4]

It is said that one of the reasons the South Korean state during the 20th century decided to extol race-based nationalism over civic nationalism was that being an right-wing authoritarian military junta at the time, it did not want to extol republican principles that might be used to criticize it in turn.[6] That said, civic state-based nationalism was said to have been stronger during those years than in contemporary post-democratization South Korea, albeit still tenuous. Ironically, though fostered by a right-wing regime at the time, today race nationalism in South Korea is shared left-wing politics.[10] For instance, when the South Korean pledge of allegiance was reworded in 2007 to use less racialist "minjok" language, it was left-leaning South Koreans who notably objected to a change.[11] However, many left-leaning South Koreans oppose the concept of danil minjok (단일민족, "monoethnic") and "pure-blood" (순혈 or 순수혈통), which was supported by far-right Ilminists and Park Chung-hee Thoughtists in the past.[12] Left-leaning South Koreans in South Korea are often more friendly to immigration and multiracialism than right-wing South Koreans. In particular, left-leaning South Koreans argue that race-based Korean ethnic nationalism has nothing to do with right-wing autocratic military junta.[13][lower-alpha 1]

South Koreans' lack of state-based nationalism (or patriotism) manifests itself in various ways in the country's society. For example, there is no national holiday solely commemorating the state itself and many South Koreans do not know the exact date their country was founded.[6] The closest analogue, Constitution Day, ceased to be a national holiday in 2008.[5] The Liberation Day holiday, which is celebrated each August, shares its date with the establishment of the South Korean state. However, celebrations during the holiday choose to forgo commemorations of the South Korean state or its establishment in favor of focusing and extolling other aspects.[6] As a result, many South Koreans do not know the exact date their own state was established,[6] in contrast to North Koreans, who do.[5] In contrast, a holiday marking the mythological formation of the "Korean race" in 2333 BC is commemorated with a national holiday in South Korea each October.[6]

The "Hell Chosun" phenomenon and a desire among many South Koreans to immigrate have also been cited as an example of South Koreans' general lack of nationalistic patriotism towards their state.[7] The lack of state-based nationalism manifests itself in diplomacy as well; the lack of a strong, resolute response by South Korea to North Korea's attacks against it in 2010 (i.e. the sinking of ROKS Cheonan and the bombardment of Yeonpyeong) has been attributed to the former's lack of state-aligned nationalistic sentiment, as these attacks were viewed as mere affronts against the state.[15][16] In contrast, Japanese claims to South Korean-claimed territory are seen as affronts against the Korean race and are thus responded to with more vigor from South Koreans.

Even state symbols that are ostensibly civic in nature, such as the national anthem, state emblem, and national flag contain racial nationalist references (such as the mugunghwa flower) instead of republican or civic ones.[6] Thus, the South Korean flag is often seen by South Koreans as representing the "Korean race" rather than merely South Korea itself.[17][18] As a result, the vast majority of South Koreans will almost always treat their national flag with reverence and respect, compared to other countries where citizens would desecrate their own national flags as political statements or in protest.[6] This weak state-based nationalism was reflected in the pre-2011 South Korean military oath and pre-2007 pledge of allegiance, both of which pledged allegiance to the "Korean race" over the state.[5][19]

One of the reasons put forth to explain South Koreans' lack of support or affinity for the South Korean state is due to a popular misconception that only North Korea purged its regime of pro-Japanese collaborators of the colonial period and that South Korea did not, while in reality the former did not do so.[4][5][20] Another reason given is that South Koreans view their interactions with their state in negative contexts, such as when having to report for mandatory military service or paying fines.[6]

South Korea's nuclear development

ROK nationalists support the possession of nuclear weapons because they are wary of North Korea and neighboring powers. However, South Korea does not currently have nuclear weapons.

Major countries surrounding South Korea, including the United States, China, Russia, and North Korea, have nuclear weapons, and state nationalist sentiment has strengthened in South Korea, especially as North Korea's nuclear development intensifies. As of 2023, 70% of South Korean people support South Korea's development and possession of nuclear weapons.[21]

South Korean's conservatism and nationalism

Many conservatives in South Korea are nationalists,[lower-alpha 2] but they are somewhat different from the "Korean nationalist" tradition. South Korean conservatives are known to oppose the Sunshine Policy based on Korean nationalism. They are less tolerant of immigrant rights and multiculturalism than liberals and progressives who support diplomatic Korean nationalism. In South Korea, simply "nationalism" (민족주의 or 내셔널리즘) mainly means "Korean nationalism".[22]

Ilminism

K-Trumpism

New Right (South Korea)

The New Right movement is usually referred to as "post-nationalism" (탈민족주의) or even "anti-nationalism" (반민족주의) but it means against Korean nationalism and not against South Korea-based "statism" or "statist nationalism" (국가주의).

Liberal "ROK nationalism"

South Korean liberals have weaker ROK nationalism or statist nationalism than conservatives, and Korean nationalism stands out. However, this is in a relative sense, and unlike leftists/progressives, conservatives and liberals both support a form of ROK nationalism or ststist nationalism with different directions.[3][23]

Legitimacy of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea

In modern South Korean politics, among ROK nationalists, staunch conservative-nationalists support the founding of 1948 (1948년 건국론),[24] while liberal-nationalists support legitimacy of the PGK (임정법통론) or the founding of 1919 (1919년 건국론).[24][3] Leftist or progressive-nationalist are both critical of anti-communism and South Korea-centered nationalism.[3][23]

The liberal Democratic Party of Korea's main politicians support "legitimacy of the PGK".[23]

Particular issues

Anti-Chinese sentiment

Some South Korea's nationalists and some conservatives are marked by anti-Chinese racism, of which even Chinese nationals belonging to the "Korean race" (or minjok) are no exception. In particular, ROK nationalists denounce the minjok ideology and at the same time show their disgust for Joseon-jok. While liberals relatively tend to perceive Joseon-jok as the same minjok, ROK nationalists and conservatives are relatively more anti-Chinese, so racism and xenophobia toward Joseon-jok are common among conservatives.[25][26]

Anti-North Korean sentiment

In the 21st century, traditional Korean ethnic nationalism has weakened among Koreans, and instead, there is a tendency to recognize those with South Korean nationality as the same ethnic. As a result, more and more South Korean people view North Korean people as ethnic or race different from them. A poll by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in 2015 found that only 5.4% of South Koreans in their twenties saw North Koreans as people sharing the same bloodline with them. The poll also found that only 11% of South Koreans associated North Korea with Koreans, with most people associating them with words like military, war or nuclear weapons. It also found that most South Koreans expressed deeper feelings of "closeness" with Americans and Chinese than with North Koreans.[27]

Japan and Untied States

South Korea's "statists" and "ROK nationalists" are weaker anti-Japanese sentiments or even more pro-Japanese than "Korean nationalists". Some anti-fascist or liberal/progressive scholars criticize ROK nationalism because early South Korean statists and ROK nationalists are historically rooted in Chinilpa (collaborators with Imperial Japan).[1]

South Korean nationalists and ROK nationalists almost all show pro-American sentiment,[1][28] some even described as "Chinmi sadaejuui[ja]" (친미 사대주의[자]; pro-American serving-the-Great[ist]).[29] However, Lee Bum-seok and some National Youth factions, was an anti-American.[30]

List of South Korean nationalist parties

In South Korea, they are usually referred to as "statism" or "statist nationalism" (국가주의) rather than "nationalism" (민족주의 or 내셔널리즘).

Current parties

Historical parties

See also

Notes

  1. Some left-leaning South Koreans strongly emphasize "minjok", because they oppose anti-North Korean-based anti-communism and supported Korean ethnic groups who have not lived in South Korea due to immigration of the Korean diaspora people caused by Japanese colonialism, division of Korea and Korean war. South Korean leftists believe that xenophobia in the South Korea mostly stems from Internalized racism based on white privilege and pro-Japanese colonialism, and argue that it has nothing to do with Korean race-based ethnic nationalism.[14]
  2. However, some moderate conservatives have less statistic or ROK nationalistic character.

References

  1. Byungsoo Lee, eds. (2019). The History of Delayed Settlement of the Pro-Japanese and the Internal Logic of Pro-Japanese. Korea Institute of Science and Technology Information.
  2. Kim Dong-no, ed. (2012). Multiplicity of Nationalism: Its Social Implications and Impacts. Korea Institute of Science and Technology Information.
  3. Lee Yongki, ed. (2019). Criticism of the Sanctification of Legitimacy Theory of the Provisional Government of Korea and the Rise of ‘ROK Nationalism’. Korea Institute of Science and Technology Information.
  4. Myers, Brian Reynolds (27 May 2010). "South Korea's Collective Shrug". The New York Times. New York. Archived from the original on April 19, 2015. Retrieved April 19, 2015.
  5. Myers, Brian Reynolds (14 September 2010). "South Korea: The Unloved Republic?". Archived from the original on May 19, 2013. Retrieved 19 May 2013.
  6. Myers, Brian Reynolds (September 22, 2011). "North Korea's state-loyalty advantage". Journal of International Affairs. Archived from the original on May 20, 2018. Retrieved June 26, 2019.
  7. Myers, Brian Reynolds (December 28, 2016). "Still the Unloved Republic". Sthele Press. Sthele Press. Retrieved June 26, 2019.
  8. Myers, Brian Reynolds (September 6, 2017). "On Experts and Exegetes". Sthele Press. Sthele Press. Retrieved June 26, 2019.
  9. Jing Yin, Seow (2013). "Pride of the People: South Korea and Korean Nationalism" (PDF). ISIS Malaysia.
  10. "South Korea: The Unloved Republic?". Archived from the original on 2015-06-09. 'Usually the South Korean left is blamed for the public's lack of patriotism,' Myers said. 'But it is the right who made blood nationalism a state religion.'
  11. Myers, Brian Reynolds (20 May 2018). "North Korea's state-loyalty advantage". Free Online Library. Archived from the original on 20 May 2018. Although the change was inspired by the increase in multiethnic households, not by the drive to bolster state-patriotism per se, the left-wing media objected ...
  12. "사회적 다양성". 경향신문. 29 December 2022.
  13. "인구절벽 해결 위해 이민 확대한다고?…국민 절반이 찬성, 보수는 '반대'" [How about expanding immigration to address the demographic cliff? ... Half of the people agree, and (hardline) conservatives 'oppose']. 매일경제. 5 September 2022.
  14. "하인스 워드를 보며 든 몇가지 생각". 오마이뉴스. 2 June 2006. Retrieved 28 February 2023. 요컨대 한국인들은 피부색이 다르다고 무조건 거부하지 않는다는 것이다. 따라서 민족의 순혈주의니 피부색 배타성은 맞지 않는다. 코를 세우고 머리를 금발로 물들이고 피부를 하얗게 하는 것은 어제 오늘의 일이 아니다. 한국인들은 백인을 닮았다고 하면 좋아하지만 흑인을 닮았다고 하면 분노한다. ... 하인스 워드 신드롬에서 많이 지적되는 말이 있다. "하인스가 한국에 있었으면 그렇게 성공할 수 있었겠는가." [South Koreans do not unconditionally reject the difference in skin color. Therefore, it is not right to talk about 'Korean ethnic nationalism' or 'exclusivity to (all races, including whites) skin colors'. It is not new for South Koreans to raise their noses, dye their hair blonde and whiten their skin. South Koreans like to hear that they look like white people, but they get angry when they hear that they look like black people. ... There is a saying that is pointed out a lot in Hines Ward Syndrome: "Would Hines have succeeded if he was born in South Korea?"]
  15. "BR Myers – Current Issues". February 24, 2014 via YouTube.
  16. "Taking North Korea at its Word | NK News – North Korea News". February 13, 2016. Archived from the original on February 13, 2016.
  17. O'Carroll, Chad (2014). "BR Myers – Current Issues". YouTube. Retrieved September 11, 2017. [T]he South Korean flag continues to function, at least in South Korea, not as a symbol of the state but as a symbol of the race.
  18. Marshall, Colin (2017). "How Korea got cool: The continued rise of a country named Hanguk". The Times Literary Supplement. Retrieved June 24, 2019. When people wave the South Korean flag, in other words, they wave the flag not of a country but of a [ethnic] people.
  19. Jeong, Jeong-hun (2006). "A pledge to a nation, or a gang oath?". The Hankyoreh. South Korea: The Hankyoreh Media Company. Archived from the original on March 15, 2016. Retrieved March 15, 2016.
  20. Myers, Brian Reynolds (March 4, 2019). "On that March First Speech". Sthele Press. Sthele Press. Retrieved June 26, 2019. We always knew anyway that there was no shortage of former collaborators in the North. The personality cult has long praised the Great Leader for giving them a second chance. In my own research I have shown that former pro-Japanese intellectuals of some notoriety made it with Kim's blessing to the top of the cultural apparatus, where they exerted a formative influence on the North.
  21. ""한국인 70%가 핵무장 찬성… 여론조사에 깜짝 놀랐다"". 조선일보. 24 January 2023. Retrieved 17 May 2023.
  22. Holmes, Anthony W. (2022-07-15). "The United Nations Command Needs A Korean Deputy Commander". 19FortyFive. Retrieved 2022-08-17. The inauguration of the new administration of President Yoon Suk-yeol of the conservative People Power Party will lead to a shared view on North Korea that was absent under Yoon's nationalist-liberal predecessor Moon Jae-in. In a rare policy triangulation, South Korea, the United States, and Japan share the same view that North Korea is first and foremost a major threat to be deterred, not a misunderstood neighbor to be consoled.
  23. "진보 역사학계 "문재인 정부 '임정 정통론'은 냉전의식 강화" 비판". 한겨레. 14 April 2019. Retrieved 18 May 2023.
  24. ""1919년 건국론은 사실이 아닌 '기념'을 위한 것"". 조선일보. 20 August 2018. Retrieved 18 May 2023.
  25. "'차이나 게이트' 군불 때는 보수···코로나 이후 '혐오 정서'에 편승". 경향신문. 5 March 2020. Retrieved 28 February 2023.
  26. ""닮은 조선족도 혐오… 피부색·GDP 차별 'K인종주의' 벗어나야"". 국민일보. 27 October 2022. Retrieved 28 February 2023.
  27. Cheng, Jonathan (2015-01-26). "In South Korea, Reunification Call Misses the Jackpot". WSJ. Retrieved 2019-07-31.
  28. 송건호, ed. (2002). 송건호전집 - Volume 13. 한길사. p. 341. ... 민족주의자인 김구도 철저한 친미 사대주의자 이승만과는 맞을 수가 없었다. 대체로 위와 같이 제각기 성장 과정 ...
  29. "촛불과 태극기 사이에 선 대한민국과 개신교". NEWS & JOY. 27 August 2021. Retrieved 17 March 2023.
  30. "해방 정국 움직인 족청계, 반공·반미 함께 주장했다". 한겨레. 15 January 2013. Retrieved 2 May 2023.
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